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On the finish of final yr, I revealed “M/I Properties: A Speculative Rally Constructed On Sand” concerning the homebuilding firm M/I Properties (MHO). At the moment, the inventory was coming off of an enormous rally from 2022 that despatched it over 3X greater. The inventory traded at $135 then and now sells for $124, 8% decrease. That article was revealed inside just a few days of MHO’s present peak.
My outlook on MHO largely stems from my views concerning the macro economic system and housing market. Though MHO has a good managerial focus, I imagine its inventory is overvalued as a result of extreme investor exuberance and a misunderstanding of its naturally cyclical enterprise. With out important inhabitants and GDP progress, the housing market can’t rise indefinitely, primarily when residence affordability and present residence gross sales are so low.
Like most builders, MHO reinvests most of its earnings into new initiatives. Whereas that follow has led to strong earnings progress in recent times, I imagine it could depart it in a weak place because the market turns over. A lot has modified over the primary half of 2024, with a clearer indication that the increase in homebuilding earnings is probably going passing. Whereas the inventory should still not be a smart brief alternative, there appear to be larger indications that its bear market has begun.
An Up to date Look At The Housing Market
The homebuilding business is carefully tied to the macroeconomic panorama. Most builders rise and fall collectively and are restricted of their potential to keep away from cyclical pressures. Thus, traders mustn’t assume that immense earnings progress will proceed as constructing demand fluctuates dramatically with the financial cycle. Given the house affordability disaster, this can be more true immediately than ever.
These measures haven’t modified dramatically over the previous six months, though there are some indications that the cycle is reversing. First, affordability and pending residence gross sales stay worse than their 2010 ranges:

Dwelling affordability is round the place it was earlier than the housing bubble crash in 2008. Current residence gross sales (not new) are additionally round 2009 minimal ranges, indicating that market exercise is mostly weak. In most cities, residence costs in comparison with incomes are greater than on the 2006 peak, exacerbated by a lot greater mortgage charges.
One principal distinction between every now and then is that market volumes are decrease, that means solely a small variety of owners are definitely in unaffordable properties. M/I Properties is extra targeted on the extra inexpensive market, with simply over half of its clients being first-time patrons. It is usually targeted most on the Southeast, Texas, and the Midwest the place properties are usually extra inexpensive. Final quarter, its common residence promoting value was $471Ok, 17% above the median residence value immediately ($420Ok). These figures are successfully related, as we’re evaluating a mean and a median (as averages on this knowledge will naturally skew excessive).
One driver of the homebuilding market’s stability regardless of low residence gross sales is the abnormally low stock ranges of present properties and lowered rental emptiness. Certainly, we are able to solely anticipate residence costs to say no if inventories are sufficiently excessive and rising, which has not been the case, however that could be altering. Following mortgage charges, there’s a extra important enhance in SFR inventories and rental vacancies. See beneath:

Rental vacancies and SFR stock are nonetheless low in comparison with 2006-2008. I believe they’re naturally decrease due to internet-based technological enhancements (corresponding to Zillow) which have led to a quicker time between residence (or rental) itemizing and closure. For a similar purpose, it could be doable that inventories/vacancies will rise at an abnormally quick tempo, although that has not but been the case.
Nationally, constructing permits have doubtless peaked and are actually headed decrease, although they’re nonetheless above their typical ranges for this housing cycle. M/I has leaned into the constructing increase and has important excellent inventories, seeing a decrease decline than the general drop in constructing permits. See beneath:

Once more, I might not say this example is as unhealthy as in 2006-2008 as a result of M/I’s inventories are solely barely elevated in comparison with its gross sales. Nonetheless, I believe the info factors towards the corporate constructing right into a glut which will turn into extra obvious as the overall financial knowledge turns into extra evident. The corporate’s contract backlog is actually unchanged YoY however properly beneath its 2022 stage, once more pointing to a requirement peak.
Essentially the most important pink flag for homebuilders can be an increase in unemployment, which might have appreciable destructive cascading penalties for brand spanking new residence gross sales demand. A big portion of individuals financed properties at decrease charges and costs, so they can not essentially afford to maneuver and purchase once more at immediately’s a lot greater costs and mortgage charges. Thus, an increase in unemployment (which might drive transferring) would doubtless catalyze a major decline within the housing market by rising inventories in immediately’s low-demand market (as seen by pending residence gross sales).
Unemployment did rise final month, although it stays traditionally low. Problematically, we can’t essentially depend on the official authorities labor knowledge. In recent times, a spot has grown between the institution and family employment surveys. The federal government seems to be to the institution survey, and although it’s typically seen as extra correct, there may be debate on that time. The newest knowledge exhibits that unemployment could also be notably greater than the official knowledge suggests. Notably, Fed Chair Jerome Powell just lately famous, “There’s an argument that they (jobs knowledge) could also be a bit overstated, however nonetheless, they’re robust.”
Though not particularly essential for M/I, that is one tell-tale signal that the US economic system just isn’t as robust as some headlines counsel. That mentioned, I additionally don’t imagine it’s so weak {that a} crash is essentially across the nook. M/I should still have time to deleverage to keep away from probably having extra stock in 2025-2026.
What’s MHO Value In the present day?
As residence inventories and vacancies rise, I anticipate we are going to see a decline in residence costs. If inflation stays sticky, it could be that residence costs don’t fall however that different costs, corresponding to development prices, rise quicker. To a level, M/I’s working margin is correlated to the ratio of residence costs to client costs or residence costs in comparison with development prices. Each figures are elevated immediately in comparison with historic ranges, indicating residence costs are as overshot as they had been in 2006. M/I’s working margins had been equally elevated at the moment. See beneath:

The noticeable distinction between now and 2008 is that fewer individuals who personal properties immediately purchased them at immediately’s extraordinarily low affordability ranges. To me, that makes it unlikely that we’ll see the identical diploma of speedy declines within the residence financing market as then, which triggered residence costs to fall too far, too quick. Nonetheless, I anticipate residence costs to drop in comparison with prices over the course of 1 to a few years.
Once more, and not using a appreciable rise in unemployment and a common financial dislocation, I solely anticipate a normalization of M/I’s revenue margin from its TTM 15% again to ~7% to eight%. The corporate has negligible curiosity prices, which ought to lead to a ~40-50% discount in its working earnings. After accounting for that and taxes, I undertaking its longer-term annual earnings might be nearer to $200M. By that estimate, its ahead “P/E” is round 17.5X. That could be manifested by 2025 on the earliest, however probably not till 2028, relying on whether or not or not the US economic system is slowing and the way the Fed reacts to that. Particularly, whether or not or not the Fed ends or reverses its QT coverage on its mortgage belongings, as that could be pushing mortgage charges greater immediately.
The Backside Line
In comparison with the final time I coated MHO, I imagine the homebuilding and single-family residential market cyclical decline might be slower than I beforehand anticipated. Nonetheless, given the rise in residence inventories, it appears much more sure that the cyclical peak for SFR properties has handed. To me, that factors to a normalization of MHO’s working margin, stemming from a protracted relative decline in new residence costs in comparison with MHO’s prices.
Once more, as I do know I will face some feedback on this level, I’m solely estimating a normalization of market situations from the Goldilocks surroundings of ~2021. I’m not predicting a 2008-like crash. In that case, I might see MHO as a brief wager, as its earnings would rapidly flip into losses in that surroundings. Though my outlook for MHO stays bearish, I don’t see it as a brief alternative. I don’t presently imagine there may be adequate knowledge to level to a big housing market crash, solely a return to extra sustainable situations.
Put merely, I don’t see how homebuilders can proceed to promote properties in a document unaffordable market with out finally seeing destructive headwinds. For my part, MHO is presently valued as if this development can proceed ceaselessly, forgetting that homebuilders are extremely cyclical.
Like most homebuilders, MHO derives the majority of its long-term worth from its staff. Though the measure is imperfect, we are able to solely anticipate a specific amount of earnings per worker over the long term throughout the financial cycle. In the present day, that determine is excessive, however it could be a lot decrease subsequent yr. Thus, I believe it is cheap to worth MHO primarily based on its relative worker rely. See beneath:

MHO’s market-cap-to-employee ratio has usually been steady all through its historical past, sustaining a traditional stage of ~$700Ok previous to the latest increase. Nonetheless, its worker rely really declined in 2023, indicating the corporate’s prospects had begun to reverse.
We may fairly make some inflationary changes to this metric and in addition account for retained money from earnings. Nonetheless, I believe the speed of enhance to this metric is yet one more indication of its overvaluation. For my part, a $2.5B valuation is extra smart, referring to a ahead “P/E” of 12.5X primarily based on my $200M long-term earnings outlook. That might relate to a market-cap-to-employee ratio of ~$1.55M, which appears extra cheap than its present stage.
As such, my share value goal for MHO is $90. That mentioned, within the occasion of a recession, I anticipate MHO to say no additional than that, relying on how the broader monetary markets react. In fact, additionally it is doable that MHO’s prospects will rebound ought to mortgage charges decline considerably and renew stability within the homebuilding surroundings. Though I imagine that’s unlikely, it might trigger my bearish outlook to shift if mortgage charges had been again beneath 4%.